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STATE V. CUNNINGHAM AND MONTANA'S RULE
ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Diane Rotering
On May 2, 1975, in the case of State v. Cunningham,' the
Montana supreme court determined that the state statutory provi-
sions on the attachment of jeopardy' violated neither the United
States nor Montana Constitutions. This note will examine that de-
cision in light of recent United States Supreme Court determina-
tions on double jeopardy.
I. THE DECISION IN STATE V. CUNNINGHAM
Clancy Cunningham was charged in Yellowstone County with
first degree assault, to which he entered a plea of "not guilty". On
the date set for trial, March 21, 1974, a jury was duly selected and
sworn. Subsequent to reading an omnibus jury instruction, the dis-
trict judge recessed court for the noon hour. When court reconvened,
the deputy county attorney informed the court that the victim of the
alleged assault, the prosecution's key witness, was not available to
testify. The victim, a resident of Wyoming, had not been served
with a subpoena. The deputy county attorney moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that a new charge of third degree assault,
based on the same incident, was being filed against defendant Cun-
ningham in the justice of the peace court. The State's motion to
dismiss was granted without objection. Defendant entered a plea of
"guilty" to the third degree assault charge and was sentenced in the
justice court to six months incarceration.
On May 17, 1974, two months after the sentencing, defendant
Cunningham, represented by different counsel, withdrew his prior
plea of "guilty" and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the third
degree assault charge. The State responded by dismissing the third
degree assault charge and refiling a first degree assault charge,
based on the same incident, in the district court. Defendant moved
to dismiss the latter charge on the ground that it placed him twice
in jeopardy, thereby violating the double jeopardy provisions of the
federal and state Constitutions.3 The district court, Honorable Rob-
1. State v. Cunningham, - Mont. -. , 535 P.2d 186, 32 St. Rptr. 433 (1975).
2. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 95-1711 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V:
• . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; . . .
MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 25:
• . . No person shall be again put in jeopardy for the same offense previously tried
in any jurisdiction.
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ert H. Wilson, granted defendant's motion to dismiss and the state
appealed to the Montana supreme court.
R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1711 provides in pertinent part:
(3) When prosecution barred by former prosecution ...
[A] prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the
following circumstances: . . .
(d) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except
as provided in this subsection, there is an improper termination of
a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an
acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness is sworn but
before verdict ...
The federal rule, by contrast, has been consistently construed by the
United States Supreme Court to mean that jeopardy attaches when
a defendant is put to trial before the trier of the facts.4 Thus in
federal court and in the majority of state courts, jeopardy attaches
in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn.'
In the Cunningham decision, the high court of Montana ac-
knowledged that in Benton v. Maryland,' the United States Su-
preme Court determined that the Fifth Amendment's proscription
against placing a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense was
applicable to state court criminal proceedings through the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 This proscription ap-
plies not only against being twice punished, but also against being
twice put in jeopardy." In continuing a trend of what has come to
be known as the process of selective incorporation,' the Supreme
Court in Benton proclaimed:
[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment presents a fundamental ideal and a constitutional
heritage, and that it should apply to the state through the Four-
teenth Amendment.t °
Once it is determined that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee
is "a fundamental ideal", it is then necessary to inquire whether the
challenged state procedure satisfies due process of law. Given the
4. Serfass v. United States, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062; United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904).
5. Serfass v. United States, supra note 4 at 1062; Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
467 (1973); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
6. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). This principle has been reiterated in
Illinois v. Somerville, supra note 5 at 468; Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 390 (1970).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1:
• . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; . ...
8. United States v. Jorn, supra note 4 at 479; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
9. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. Benton v. Maryland, supra note 6 at 794.
1976]
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fundamental nature of the right, in this case protection against
double jeopardy, is a particular procedure such as the time of at-
tachment of jeopardy, essential to the protection of that right? Or,
as the Montana supreme court phrased it:
[1us the federal rule [jeopardy attaches when the jury is impa-
neled] so fundamental to the American system of justice that the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates its
application to state court criminal proceedings?"'
In answering that question, the court maintained the federal rule
was not essential to the right of a defendant to be protected against
double jeopardy, and that Montana was thus at liberty to adopt its
own rule.
We perceive no inherent merit in the federal rule over Montana's
state law ...
We fail to see in what manner the federal rule protects against
[prosecutorial manipulation] to a greater extent than Montana
law. Prosecutorial manipulation can be effected as easily under
one rule as under the other ...
Nor do we see any greater protection in the federal rule as far as
securing to defendant the right to have his trial completed before
the court and jury selected to try his case ...
We find no substantial difference between the two rules.
2
The court implied that the Montana rule that specifies jeop-
ardy attaches when the first witness is sworn is as "fundamentally
fair" to a defendant as the federal rule that specifies jeopardy at-
taches when the jury is impaneled. It is true that the states were
once free to determine for themselves at what point jeopardy at-
taches." In a series of recent decisions, however, the United States
Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that the states could
fashion for themselves a "watered-down, subjective version" of the
individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Mr. Justice Marshall
expressed the sentiments of the Court on this issue in the Benton
decision:
Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that
basic constitutional rights can be denied by the states as long as
the totality of the circumstances does not disclose a denial of "fun-
damental fairness."'
5
11. State v. Cunningham, supra note 1 at 188.
12. Id. at 188-189.
13. The Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) found that
point to be where the defendant has been subjected to a "hardship so acute and so shocking
that our polity will not endure it."
14. Benton v. Maryland, supra note 6 at 794; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.1, 10-11 (1964).
15. Benton v. Maryland, supra note 6 at 795.
[Vol. 37
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By applying a "watered-down, subjective version" of fundamental
fairness in Cunningham, the Montana supreme court contravened
the spirit of Benton. In determining whether a particular procedure
is essential to the protection of a fundamental right it is incumbent
upon a state court to abide by standards established in the federal
system:
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Duncan v.
Louisiana (391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)), the same constitutional stan-
dards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.
Palko's roots had thus been cut away years ago. We today only
recognize the inevitable. 6 [Emphasis added.]
Insofar as it was inconsistent with the mandate in Benton, Palko
was overruled."
The significance of this for state criminal courts is that once the
Supreme Court has determined that a Bill of Rights guarantee is a
fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment makes that guaran-
tee applicable to the states.'" What Benton does indicate is that
when the United States Supreme Court has determined that a par-
ticular federal procedure is essential to the protection of a funda-
mental right, the determination establishes a minimum standard
which state courts are compelled to follow. Other due process deci-
sions illustrate this concept.
Since 1960, the Supreme Court has selectively incorporated an
increasing number of the Bill of Rights guarantees into the Four-
teenth Amendment. "And in that process, the Court insisted that,
once incorporated, the scope of the guarantee would be exactly the
same in state and federal proceedings."'" Duncan v. Louisiana' °
summarizes the incorporation development and reflects the current
approach in criminal due process analysis: de facto incorporation of
most procedural guarantees in exactly the manner in which they
apply to the federal government." A pertinent example reflecting
this development concerns the Fifth Amendment privilige against
16. Id.
17. Id. at 794.
18. See Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 375,
404 (1972), setting forth the proposition that to impose upon the state every detail of incorpo-
rated federal guarantees would derogate basic principles of federalism and would deprive the
states of "freedom to experiment with adjudicatory processes different from the federal
model."
19. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, pp. 525-526 (9th ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 9.
21. Gunther, supra note 19 at 526.
1976]
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self-incrimination." In Molloy v. Hogan,"3 the Supreme Court held
that privilege to be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. A year later, in Griffin v. California, the Court found
a particular state procedure that permitted the prosecution to com-
ment on a defendant's failure to testify to be unconstitutional.,
What the attachment of jeopardy question in Cunningham
lacks is the adjudicative equivalent of Griffin v. California. In arriv-
ing at its conclusion, the Montana supreme court did not have the
guidance of an express mandate proclaiming time of attachment to
be essential to the fundamental right of protection against double
jeopardy. Nonetheless, there are extensive resources to which the
Montana court could have referred in endeavoring to determine
whether time of attachment was essential.
One such resource is the United States Supreme Court's re-
peated reference, in establishing the essential nature of a particular
procedure, to the function that procedure performs and its relation
to the purpose underlying a fundamental right.2 5 The function per-
formed by the federal rule on attachment of jeopardy is evident; it
operates to ensure that jeopardy attaches when a defendant is put
to trial before the trier of the facts. 2 The distinction in federal courts
between jury and non-jury trials and its relation to the concept of
attachment of jeopardy has been consistently adhered to by the
United States Supreme Court, most recently in Serfass v. United
States. 7 In that decision the Court reaffirmed the longstanding
principle that in a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impa-
neled and sworn. That the federal rule has been in effect for a long
period of time supports the argument that such a rule is essential
to the fundamental right. The Supreme Court has often used the
history and extent of reliance upon a particular procedure as criteria
in establishing the essential standards of procedure.
28
Although articulated in various ways by the Supreme Court,
the purpose and policies which animate the Double Jeopardy Clause
are equally clear:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
22. U.S. CONST. amend V:
. . . nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ...
23. Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 14.
24. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
25. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
26. See authorities cited supra note 4.
27. Serfass v. United States, supra note 4 at 1062.
28. Stovall v. Denno, supra note 25; Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 25.
[Vol. 37
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its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. 9
Another "deeply ingrained" purpose underlying the protection
against double jeopardy concerns the valued right of a defendant to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. 0
The Montana rule operates to deprive defendant Cunningham
of both underlying protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Such
a deprivation engenders a manifest contravention of the theory be-
hind the extension of due process guarantees to the states. The
Supreme Court recognized the futility of extending a fundamental
right to defendants in state criminal proceedings without also ex-
tending the procedural protections in Mapp v. Ohio:
Since the Fourteenth Amendment's right of privacy has been de-
clared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern-
ment. Were it otherwise, [the] freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coerc-
ing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
. . Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of
due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or
federal-it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the
exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to privacy--be
also insisted upon. . . . To hold otherwise is to grant the right but
in reality withhold its privilege and enjoyment .... 1
The same granting of the right but withholding of the privilege
occurs in double jeopardy situations as a result of the Montana rule.
To submit that states must offer defendants the protection of the
general concept of double jeopardy but not the protections envis-
aged by the specific federal standards of double jeopardy is to sever
the privilege from its conceptual nexus. The end result is to provide
Clancy Cunningham with less protection in a state court than he
would be accorded in a federal court. Such a determination does not
appear to be in accord with the intentions of the Supreme Court as
expressed in Benton.
32
29. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
30. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-656 (1961).
32. In Curry v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 2 Cal. 3d 707,
1976] 243
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Mapp v. Ohio is significant to the Cunningham determination
for an additional reason. Following a Supreme Court decision estab-
lishing the federal exclusionary rule,13 several states voluntarily al-
tered their criminal procedures so as to include equivalents of the
federal exclusionary rule. The adoption of the federal rule by these
states was one of the factors that inspired the Supreme Court in
Mapp v. Ohio to mandate uniform application of the federal rule to
all of the states .3 A similar situation attends the circumstances in
the attachment of jeopardy inquiry. Since the high Court's decision
in Benton, a number of states have conformed their rules of criminal
procedure to the federal rule on attachment of jeopardy.
35
Duncan v. Louisiana, a decision antedating Benton, may well
provide the most compelling indication that the Supreme Court,
were it to confront a time of attachment question, would determine
that the federal rule is to be made applicable to the states. In the
Duncan case the state of Louisiana maintained that while the
United States Constitution 36 required that citizens be granted a
right to trial by jury, the state retained the latitude and discretion
to determine when that right should be conferred. Much like the
Montana court's reasoning on the attachment of jeopardy, the
Louisiana court maintained that as long as the state constitution
3 7
470 P.2d 345, 350-351, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970), the California supreme court interpreted
Benton as follows:
Benton requires only that the states accord their citizens at least as much protec-
tion against double jeopardy as is provided under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. [Emphasis supplied.]
See also State v. Boyd, - Ore. -, 527 P.2d 128, 131 (1974) for the proposition that the
standard of the double jeopardy rule prohibiting a second prosecution where the charges arose
out of the same act or transaction, is the constitutional minimum.
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 31 at 654-655.
35. Recent cases holding that jeopardy attaches in a state proceeding when the jury is
impaneled and sworn: Torres v. State, 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974); Bunnell v. Superior Court,
- Cal, 3d __, 531 P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302, (1975); Maes v. District Court, 180 Colo.
169, 503 P.2d 621 (1972); Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343 (Del. Supr. 1974); State v.
Warren, 133 Ga. App. 743, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975); People v. King, 1 Ill. App. 3d 757, 275 N.E.2d
213 (1971); Crim v. State, Ind. - , 294 N.E.2d 822 (1973); State v. Gustin, 212 Kan.
475, 510 P.2d 1290 (1973); Blondes v. State, 19 Md. 714, 314 A.2d 746 (1974); In re Juvenile,
- Mass. - 306 N.E.2d 822 (1974); Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. den. 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson City, 90 Nev. 227, 523 P.2d 841
(1974); United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 479 F.2d 773 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414
U.S. 1008 (1973); People v. Scott, - N.Y.2d __, 40 A.D. 2d 933, 337 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972);
State v. Charis, 24 N.C. App. 148, 210 S.E.2d 555 (1974); State v. A~lesi, 216 N.W.2d 805
(N.D. 1974); In re Lamb, 34 Ohio A.2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973); State v. Ellis, 14 Ore. App.
84, 511 P.2d 1264 (1973); Commonwealth v. Smith, 232 Pa. 546, 334 A.2d 741 (1975).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed. ...
37. LA. CONST. art. VII § 41:
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provided the right to jury trial in capital cases, there was compli-
ance with the provisions of the Sixth Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice White, emphatically dis-
agreed:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee. Since we consider the
appeal before us to be such a case, we hold that the Constitution
was violated when appellant's demand for jury trial was refused."8
Thus the federal standards of trial by jury and not merely the gen-
eral concept of the Sixth Amendment were made applicable to the
states through the due process clause. The Duncan decision, strik-
ing in its similarity to the "fundamental" language in Benton, indi-
cates by analogy that the federal standards as to when jeopardy
attaches should likewise be applied to the states.
The Cunningham decision would perhaps have disappeared
quietly into the shadows had it not borne so heavily upon a case of
much greater import in Montana. On October 31, 1974, the State
of Montana filed a multiple-count information against Merrel
Cline, Shirley Lankford Cline and L. R. Bretz in the initial stages
of prosecution emanating from the Attorney General's investigation
of the Workman's Compensation Division.39 On April 4, 1975, subse-
quent to the selection, impanelment and swearing of the jury, this
information was dismissed, and a new one filed against the same
defendants, charging them with identical offenses.40 The second in-
formation culminated in verdicts of guilty against all three defen-
dants. Appeals on the conviction to the Montana supreme court4
All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall . . . be tried by
the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor,
shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases,
in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of
whom must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be
capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
38. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 9 at 149-150.
39. Criminal Cause No. 3921, The State of Montana, Plaintiff v. Merrel Cline, L.R.
Bretz and Shirley Lankford Cline, Defendants, before the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Montana, in and for the County of Lewis and Clark.
40. Criminal Cause No. 3963, The State of Montana, Plaintiff v. Merrel Cline, L.R.
Bretz and Shirley Lankford Cline, Defendants, before the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Montana, in and for the county of Lewis and Clark.
41. On July 23, 1975, the Montana supreme court denied petitions by L.R. Bretz and
Merrel Cline for writs of habeas corpus. See State ex rel. Bretz v. Sheriff of Lewis and Clark
County, 32 State Rptr. 762, 539 P.2d 1191 (1975).
1976]
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as well as petitions to federal district court for writs of habeas
corpus42 are currently pending.
II. WHEN THE ATrACHMENT OF JEOPARDY PROHIBITS RETRIAL
There is a second, complex and highly volatile issue concerning
double jeopardy that the Montana court did not discuss. The issue
involves the cases in which a mistrial has been declared prior to the
verdict. In such cases, the conclusion that jeopardy has attached
begins the inquiry of whether the double jeopardy clause bars a
retrial. 3 As the United States Supreme Court noted in Wade v.
Hunter, "a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated
to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judg-
ments."" A leading decision construing the double jeopardy clause
in the context of a mistrial is United States v. Perez.45 In that
decision, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for a unanimous court, de-
clared:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving
any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstan-
ces into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. . . .To be
sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under
urgent circumstances .... 46
The problem of moving from the general formula articulated in
Perez to the facts of an individual case is complicated by the ab-
sence of any rigid rules. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the use of a rigid, mechanical formula in Illinois v.
Somerville." Nonetheless, it is possible to distill a general approach
premised on the "manifest necessity" and "public justice" policy of
Perez. The Court in Perez recognized two lines of authority. The
first indicates that a proper exercise of judicial discretion in declar-
ing a mistrial occurs when an impartial verdict cannot be reached,
when physical circumstances such as the illness, death or absence
of a judge, juror or defendant prevents the continuance of the trial,
or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be
42. In November 1975, consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed on
behalf of L.R. Bretz, Merrel Cline and Clancy Cunningham in the United States District
Court, District of Montana, Billings Division, Hon. James F. Battin, presiding.
43. Illinois v. Somerville, supra note 5 at 462.
44. Wade v. Hunter, supra note 30 at 689.
45. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824).
46. Id. at 580.
47. Illinois v. Somerville, supra note 5 at 462.
[Vol. 37
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reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial."8
Retrials are permitted when a court properly determines, under
the circumstances, that "manifest necessity" and "public justice"
mandated the declaration of mistrial. The crucial question is
whether there was manifest necessity. The first line of authority
cited by the Somerville Court enumerates instances where such
necessity existed,49 while the second line of authority concerns what
the Court refers to as "prosecutorial manipulation.""0
The facts in Cunningham do not resemble the first line of au-
thority as the circumstances surrounding the dismissal disclose nei-
ther the incidence of prejudice that would have impeded the obtain-
ment of an impartial verdict, nor the occurence of procedural error
that would have warranted dismissal of the jury. Downum v. United
States, the case relied on by the Somerville Court to exemplify the
occurrence of "prosecutorial manipulation," does bear striking re-
semblance to Cunningham, however. In Downum, the prosecuting
attorney proceeded with the selection and swearing of the jury be-
fore discerning whether or not the key prosecution witness was pres-
ent to testify. The witness had not been served with a subpoena. In
Cunningham, the prosecuting attorney likewise proceeded with jury
impanelment before determining whether the key witness, who had
not been subpoenaed, was available on the day of the trial. In both
Downum and Cunningham the jury was discharged as a result of the
witnesses' absence.
While the absence of witnesses will not always bar a retrial,51
the Supreme Court in Downum determined that the lack of prosecu-
torial diligence in securing the presence of a vital witness, coupled
with the jury impanelment before the prosecution ascertained
whether the witness was in fact present, did not amount to a "mani-
fest necessity". The second prosecution thus constituted double
jeopardy and was therefore a violation of a constitutional right of
the defendant." It appears that the same conclusion should have
been reached in Cunningham.
The controversy between "manifest necessity" and "prosecu-
torial manipulation" on the issue of procedural error has the most
extensive ramifications for the Bretz-Cline appeal. In the
Somerville case, the Supreme Court determined that the defective
indictment filed against the defendant did not prevent a retrial. The
48. Id. at 464.
49. Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909);
Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
50. Downum v. United States, supra note 5.
51. Wade v. Hunter, supra note 30 at 691.
52. Downum v. United States, supra note 5 at 737-738. See also Cornero v. United
States, 48 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1931).
19761
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determinative provisions of Illinois criminal procedure were drawn
in such a way so as to leave the trial court with no alternative but
to dismiss the indictment and begin anew. The Supreme Court
determined that the lack of available alternatives under Illinois
criminal procedure constituted "manifest necessity" and that the
declaration of a mistrial was commensurate with the "ends of public
justice."
In United States v. Jorn,5 by contrast, the filing of an insuffi-
cient information did operate to prevent a retrial. That conclusion
was premised upon the fact that alternatives other than mistrial,
such as trial continuance or amendment of information, were avail-
able to the trial court. The failure to utilize such alternatives was
determined to be an abuse of judicial discretion.5 If on appeal it is
resolved that jeopardy did in fact attach, the presence or absence
of alternatives available at the time of the dismissal of the first
information in the Bretz-Cline case will be determinative of whether
there was a "manifest necessity" compelling the dismissal.
An additional consideration, one that would pose implications
for both the Cunningham and Bretz-Cline cases, was first articu-
lated in Gori v. United States."8 While primarily adhering to the
Perez theme of "manifest necessity" the Court did nonetheless sug-
gest a variation of that theme based upon a determination by the
appellate court as to which party was the beneficiary of the mistrial
ruling. If it appears that the mistrial operates fundamentally to
benefit the defendant, an appellate court may be reluctant to con-
clude that there was an abuse of discretion. This was the conclusion
in Gori. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the mistrial
ruling benefitted the prosecution by providing them with a second
opportunity to seek conviction, an appellate court may well con-
clude that there was an abuse of discretion and thus prohibit a
retrial.5 17 In the final analysis a judge must always temper the deci-
sion to dismiss the jury by weighing foremost the valued right of a
defendant to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. 8
CONCLUSION
In an endeavor to inject substantive content into the spacious
language of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court has
continued to look to the Bill of Rights and the specific guarantees
53. Illinois v. Somerville, supra note 5 at 469.
54. United States v. Jorn, supra note 4.
55. Id. at 487.
56. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
57. United States v. Jorn, supra note 4 at 482-483.
58. Wade v. Hunter, supra note 30 at 689.
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therein. Such was the circumstance in Benton v. Maryland. The
nation's high Court spoke clearly when it directed that the same
constitutional standards of double jeopardy apply equally against
both the state and federal governments. Section 95-1711 R.C.M.
1947, and the Montana supreme court's decision in Cunningham
deny defendant Cunningham the protection he would be accorded
in the federal system as well as in the majority of state criminal
justice schemes.
AUTHOR'S NOTE - In a decision rendered on December 31, 1975,
the consolidated writs of habeas corpus filed in United States Dis-
trict Court on behalf of L.R. Bretz, Merrel Cline and Clancy Cun-
ningham were denied. Cunningham v. District Court, CV-75-112-
BLG; Bretz v. Crist, CV-75-113-BLG; Cline v. State of Montana,
CV-75-114-BLG. The judge, the Hon. James F. Battin, premised
that decision on the conclusion that Montana's procedural rule on
the attachment of jeopardy does not present a "watered-down ver-
sion" of the constitutional right. Upon finding that a defendant's
substantive rights receive no less protection under the Montana
statute than under federal procedures, Judge Battin concluded
that:
Since the substance of the right has been clearly preserved, then
the object of the constitutional provision guaranteeing that the
defendant shall not be placed in jeopardy twice has been met.
Citing Somerville, Judge Battin commented, arguendo, that even if
petitioners Bretz and Cline had been subjected to double jeopardy,
manifest necessity would nonetheless require a further trial to be
held since the prosecutorial error culminating in the dismissal of the
first charges was merely a typographical error. Judge Battin did
not mention the United States v. Jorn analysis involving available
alternatives, nor does he comment upon what the outcome would
have been for petitioner Cunningham in light of Downum.
Attorneys for petitioners Bretz, Cline and Cunningham have
indicated that the United States District Court decision will be
appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
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